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LEGAL PROBLEMS OF UPPER SPACE
By

JOHN COBB COOPER

Princeton, N. J.; Professor, Institute of International Air Law,
McGill University.
[Reprinted from the Proceedings of the American Society of Inter-

national Law, 1956, pp. 85-93.]

TODAY neither lawyers nor governments are prepared to state the

legal flight rules applicable to presently operating rockets and
planned satellites. For the second time in the present century science
and engineers have far outstripped the law. Such delay may be normal
where legal rules must depend on known and accepted factual situations, but the gap between technological and legal progress must never
be permitted to become too wide.
The present problem confronting us is this: Flight instrumentalities, such as rockets, satellites and other spacecraft do not fall within
existing national or international regulatory provisions. Nor is there
any agreement as to what, if any, national or international regulation
is applicable to space above the atmosphere where such rockets and
satellites will normally be used. This existing legal hiatus can lead
to grave international misunderstanding if permitted to continue too
long.
Flight technology first outdistanced the law in the early years of
the present century when it became necessary to determine whether
aircraft and balloons were vehicles like automobiles or whether they
had nationality like ships; also, whether the atmosphere space in which
they operated was or was not part of the territory of the subjacent state.
The manner in which these questions were settled reveals the extent
of the dangerous legal hiatus which now confronts us.
Flight became a factor in international affairs when it could be
controlled by man. The airship flights of von Zeppelin between 1900
and 1902, and the airplane flight of the Wright brothers in 1903, were
the real beginning. But governments were slow to fix the legal rules,
and jurists were not in agreement. In 1906, in the much-discussed
debates in the Institute of International Law, Fauchille urged freedom
of flight and Westlake insisted upon national airspace sovereignty. But
the importance of this discussion has, in my judgment, been exaggerated. It had little, if any, influence on the subsequent activities of
states. Fauchille ignored the fact that distinguished jurists had long
insisted that territory must be three dimensional. Westlake, while
supporting sovereignty, appeared to believe that such sovereignty
should be subject to an international right of innocent passage through
the airspace, although no state ever accepted this dictum in practice.
Governments did not become really concerned until France, in 190-8
and 1909, took alarm at the number of German balloons which were
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drifting into France, many apparently manned by military personnel,
and called the celebrated 1910 International Air Navigation Conference. This met in Paris to consider the possible regulations of inter-,
national flight. The United States was not invited, as it was considered
too far away to be affected. On more than one occasion I have stated
my view that the proceedings of this 1910 Paris Conference, with its
almost completed draft convention, indicated general agreement that
each state had full sovereignty in then usable space over its national
lands and waters, that no general right of international transit existed
for aircraft of other states in the absence of international convention,
and that the only practical legal method of regulating international
flight was by agreement which would provide for the grant of privileges
of flight through such national space.
By legislative acts and diplomatic conduct in the intervening years
between the 1910 Conference and the outbreak of World War I, Europe indicated acceptance of these principles. Events at the outbreak
of World War I and during that war, as well as the preparation and
signature of the Paris Convention of 1919, gave further evidence of
the validity of the principle of absolute sovereignty of the subjacent
state over the "air space," and also of the fact that aircraft have
nationality.
The Paris 1919 Convention was signed and ratified in French and
Italian as well as in English. The words "air space" appear in the
French version as "espace atmosphdrique"and in the Italian as "spazio
atmosferico." It seems apparent from this that the words "air space"
in the English version meant, without question, "atmospheric space."
In many articles of the convention, the flight instrumentalities to
be regulated are described as "aircraft," and their nationality is recognized. Under the system of the Paris Convention, its subsequently
adopted annexes became part of the convention itself. In these annexes
an "aircraft" is defined as follows: "The word 'aircraft' shall comprise
all machines which can derive support in the atmosphere from reactions of the air." In Annex A various classes of "aircraft" included
balloons, airships, land planes, sea planes and helicopters.
Taking together the assertion of state sovereignty in Article I, with
this definition of "aircraft," it may be said that the Paris Convention
declared that each state was sovereign in those areas of space where
sufficient gaseous atmosphere existed to lift and support balloons,
airships, and airplanes, as well as other types of flight instrumentalities
which could "derive support in the atmosphere from reactions of the
air." Man had not yet conceived the possibility of any other type of
flight instrumentality, nor had he had occasion to regulate areas of
space other than those used by "aircraft."
In 1926, by the adoption of the Air Commerce Act, the United
States (which signed but did not ratify the Paris Convention) declared
itself to possess complete and exclusive national sovereignty in the
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airspace over the United States, and defined aircraft to mean "any
contrivance now known or hereafter invented, used or designed for
navigation or flight in the air." These rules were carried forward in
the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, and are still part of our law. It is
conceivable that this definition of aircraft is broader than the Paris
definition, as it seems to include flight instrumentalities used for flight
in the air even though not supported thereby.
The Chicago Convention of 1944, to which most of the states
engaged in international aviation are parties, except the U.S.S.R.,
restated in Article I the provisions of the Paris Convention as to airspace sovereignty in this manner: "The contracting States recognize
that every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty of the airspace
above its territory." Again, as in the Paris Convention, this is a statement of customary international law and not an exchange of privileges
between the states concerned. Also, the Chicago Convention deals
with the regulation of "aircraft" which are given the attribute of
nationality. But neither "airspace" nor "aircraft" is defined.
Under the Chicago Convention the technical standards, called
annexes, do not become parts of the convention. They are prepared
by the International Civil Aviation Organization, and are then submitted to the member states for acceptance. Any state finding it
impractical to comply in all respects with such standards must so advise
the International Civil Aviation Organization.
During the Chicago Conference, the United States submitted suggestions for future annexes, including the definition of aircraft similar
to that in the Air Commerce Act of 1926 as stated above. But the
Chicago Conference inserted in the tentative annexes the definition of
aircraft as it had already existed in its narrower form in the Paris
Convention annex. Subsequently, the International Civil Aviation
Organization, when formally adopting the present Annex 7 dealing
with Aircraft Nationality and Registration Marks, defined aircraft as
''any machine that can derive support in the atmosphere from the
reactions of the air." This is almost exactly the Paris definition adopted
many years earlier. In the same annex, the term "aircraft" is stated to
include balloons, airships, airplanes and helicopters, and other similar
instrumentalities requiring support in the atmosphere from reactions
of the air in order to maintain flight.
When this annex was submitted to the member states of the International Civil Aviation Organization, no objection was apparently
raised by the United States or any other member state, and it may
therefore be that this is the definition which the United States must
apply in international use rather than its own definition. This, however, is a problem which has not yet arisen, but which may become
acute if a type of flight instrumentality is launched by the United
States, which is covered by our own definition of "aircraft," but is not
included in the international definition adopted pursuant to the
Chicago Convention.
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From the foregoing the following appears to be the present legal
situation:
(a) Both the Paris and Chicago conventions have dealt only
with those flight instrumentalities which derive support in the
atmosphere from reactions of the air, such as the balloon or airplane, and have not dealt with such instrumentalities as rockets,
satellites, and other space craft which are designed to move through
space without atmospheric support.
(b) The Chicago Convention contains no definition of "airspace" but it may well be argued that, as it was adapted from the
Paris Convention, it deals with no areas of space other than those
parts of the atmosphere where the gaseous air is sufficiently dense to
support balloons and airplanes. The highest flight by any unmanned balloon up to the present time is 140,000 feet, by a manned
balloon 72,395 feet, and the highest airplane flight is 90,000 feet.
(c) Nothing in the Chicago Convention precludes the possibility of state sovereignty being extended by international agreement, or by unilateral force, above the areas in which the airplane
and balloon can be used, but there is certainly no basis on which
any customary international law can as yet be considered applicable
to such higher areas.
(d) Airspace over the high seas is now free for use by all.
The present technical situation is also of major importance. Basing
my information solely upon public disclosure in the press and the
current literature, I would invite your attention to the following:
(a) Rockets of the so-called V-2 type, as used in the
attacks on London, are understood to have been driven to
of about 114 miles. An American rocket, which consisted
plus an additional rocket stage, has been publicly stated
reached an altitude of about 250 miles.

German
a height
of a V-2
to have

(b) It now appears that there is an area between the highest
possible balloon flight-let us say, 30 miles above the surface of the
earth-and 200 to 300 miles above the surface of the earth, in which
continuous or extended satellite flights may be extremely difficult
due to the presence of sufficient atmosphere to create serious "drag"
or heating.
(c) In other words, it is now suggested that the future satellite
flight will be most practical for long distances only if conducted not
less than 200 or 300 miles above the surface of the earth.
In July, 1955, the United States announced that it would support
a series of satellite flights as part of the wide scientific investigation of
the 1957-1958 International Geophysical Year. Some of the details of
the proposed flights have now been disclosed. It is planned to drive a
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three-stage rocket at least 200 miles above the surface of the earth,
carrying in its nose the "satellite," which will be a round object about
the size of a basketball. The directions of the various stages of the
rocket will be so changed that when the satellite is discharged and
starts on its free orbit it should be approximately parallel to the surface
of the earth. Based on the much-discussed principle that if the speed of
the rocket at that point is sufficient to counterbalance the attraction
of the earth, the satellite should continue on an orbit around the earth
for several days or even for several weeks, the time being dependent,
among other things, on the amount of atmospheric "drag." The satellite will carry in its small bulk an amazing collection of instruments
for obtaining information deemed by the scientists to be of the greatest
possible future value. The International Geophysical Year, of which
this satellite program is part, is directed by committees made up of
scientists of many different nations. But the satellite itself will be
launched by the United States Government.
Two authorities have already dealt with the legal problems of this
flight. Mr. Andrew G. Haley, General Counsel of the American Rocket
Society, presented a paper at the annual meeting of that Society in
November, 1955, in which he seemed to suggest that the areas of space
above the atmosphere to be used by the satellite might be subject to
some sovereign control of the subjacent states, but that failure of any
state to object to the International Geophysical Year satellite program
at the time of its announcement was all that was required in order to
make the completion of the program possible. He added that "The
Scientists have benefited mankind as a whole in a field where the
lawyers might well have failed."
Quite a different thesis has been put forward by Mr. C. Wilfred
Jenks, an Associate of the Institute of International Law.1 In his
article Mr. Jenks noted the announcement by the White House of a
satellite program "to circle the earth in 90 minutes at a height of 300
miles." His legal position is, apparently, that space beyond the atmosphere of the earth is and must always be incapable of appropriation
by the projection into such space of any particular sovereignty based
on a fraction of the earth's surface. He argues that the acceptance of
such complete international freedom in these areas of space is required
by astronomical and physical facts, and he contends that the only activities "within the atmosphere of the earth would appear to be susceptible
of the degree of control similar in general nature to that which can be
exercised in territorial waters or over a wider maritime frontier belt."
It would therefore appear that Mr. Jenks denies the existence or
possibility of national sovereignty in areas of space beyond the atmosphere-say from 300 miles above the earth's surface upward. He
continues:
"International Law and Activities in Space," 5 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 99-114 (January, 1956).
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It would- seem important to accept this principle fully from the
earliest stages of the exploitation and exploration of space, and it
is of interest that the United States plan for launching space
satellites appears to be based upon it. There is no indication in the
United States plan that it is proposed to negotiate passage agreements with the subjacent sovereignties. Moreover, such rights cannot be claimed under the International Civil Aviation Convention,
since, even assuming the Convention to be applicable beyond the
atmosphere and disregarding the fact that certain States, including
the U.S.S.R., are not parties to it, the Convention provides that
pilotless aircraft will not be flown over the territory of contracting
States without special authorization.

The statements by Mr. Haley and Mr. Jenks point up the importance of the problem to be considered-namely, What is the legal status
of the space beyond the atmosphere where rockets and satellites can
be operated without undue atmospheric interference?

A subsidiary question involves the status of the intermediate area
between the upper level of the atmosphere used by aircraft and the
lowest height at which a rocket or satellite may freely be operated. I
am not sure that we yet have the scientific data necessary to determine
the extent to which rockets or satellites may safely use this intermediate
area. At least I do.not feel that sufficient data is publicly available.
Five years ago, in what may have been the earliest present-day discussion of the question of the legal status of space at high altitudes,2
I suggested that the time had come when "we must agree that there is
an upper boundary in space to the territory of the subjacent State,"
and I said:
Certain jurists have insisted that the territory of a State is
limited by the ability of that State to make its law effective. This
is a harsh rule when applied to sovereignty in space. The richest
and most powerful States now have means through high altitude
rockets to control more or less effectively the "airspace" over their
surface territories. But the weaker States have no such power.
Can we be said to live in such a world where the physical power
at any one time of any particular State determines its international
right to consider the region above its surface territories as part
of its national territory? I may say here that my own belief is
and has always been that if the rule of effectiveness is to be applied
to determine the limit of State territory in space, then the rule
should be that every State, no matter how small or how weak, as a
State of equal sovereignty with every other State, has and should
be admitted to have territorial rights upwards above its surface
territories as high as the rights of every other State no matter how
powerful.
At the same time I indicated that this left open such questions as
the extent of contemplated control, and the means by which an international determination could be made of the ability of the most powerful state to extend its control into outer space. Long and careful
consideration during the past five years has convinced me of the exist"High Altitude Flight and National Sovereignty," 4 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 411-418 (1951).
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ence of almost insuperable difficulties in applying the rule which I
then suggested. The only practical way to solve the questions as to the
legal status of areas above those covered by a strict construction of
Article I of the Chicago Convention will be the adoption of some form
of international agreement.
'Such a new convention might include these solutions:
(a) Reaffirm Article I of the Chicago Convention, giving the
subjacent state full sovereignty in the areas of atmospheric space
above it, up to the height where "aircraft" as now defined, may be
operated, such areas to be designated "territorial space."
(b) Extend the sovereignty of the subjacent state upward to
300 miles above the earth's surface, designating this second area as
"contiguous space," and provide for a right of transit through this
zone for all non-military flight instrumentalities when ascending
or descending.
(c) Accept the principle that all space above "contiguous space"
is free for the passage of all instrumentalities.
These solutions would aid future peaceful use of rockets and satellites and would seem to provide reasonable security for the subjacent
state. At the same time, the territory of the state would be extended
upward even beyond the areas in which it might make its normal laws
effective. For I venture to suggest that, due in part to the physical
problems involved, in part to the enormous speeds of the flight instrumentalities concerned, as well as many other difficulties, it will be most
unlikely that any state can make its normal day-by-day laws effective
very high in space. I do not deny the possibility that with modern
weapons, such as guided missiles, a state may exercise military command quite high into space, provided it is certain that its activities
are within the areas which are really above its own territory. But I
must differentiate between such military control as may be involved in
shooting down an intruder, and the normal civil control that a state
must have day by day to enforce in its territory the peacetime laws
under which men live together.
These ideas are put forward only as suggestions. The main problem is that an agreement would be most useful regarding the status
of space above the "territorial space" covered by the Chicago Convention. As a word of caution, I would again suggest that we may not yet
have the physical and scientific information needed to reach immediately the soundest decisions. The data being collected by the International Geophysical Year program will help tremendously. But it
would be unfortunate if international rules of future high altitude
flight control were adopted, and if it were then found that they were
based on incorrect theories as to the physical characteristics and usefulness of various areas in the upper atmosphere and beyond.
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At this point I wish to express my appreciation to my one-time
colleague at the Institute of International Air Law, Mr. R. S. S. Allen
of London, who under my direction has done a great deal of research
in certain of the problems here discussed. It was Mr. Allen who first
suggested to me the advisability of three zones, although the zones
which are now indicated are not exactly those he had in mind.
Certain additional questions require consideration. If a new convention is not adopted, should the International Civil Aviation Organization amend its annexes so as to expand its definition of "aircraft"
to include instrumentalities which, like rockets and satellites, were not
contemplated at Chicago? It must be recalled that Article XII of the
Chicago Convention already gives to the International Civil Aviation
Organization the power to adopt flight rules as to the operation of
aircraft when over the high seas. This article would have greater significance if "aircraft" included rockets and satellites when flying above
the high seas.
Another problem to be dealt with is the difficult question of nationality. The whole theory of nationality, as derived from the law of the
sea, is based on the concept that when a state gives to a ship the right
to use its flag, such state assumes certain international responsibilities
for the good conduct of that ship on the high seas and in foreign ports
and at the same time acts as. the protector of the ship to enforce its
international rights. Under the Chicago Convention, aircraft are given
the same characteristic of nationality. In addition, Article VIII deals
with aircraft "capable of being flown without a pilot," and it would
seem that such pilotless aircraft also have nationality. While the application of the rule of nationality to rockets and satellites may be difficult, nevertheless if upper space is to be free like the high seas, then
certainly a state must be prepared to be responsible for the international good conduct of its rockets and satellites; otherwise chaos
might result. Nationality must be considered when these new types
of flight instrumentalities are brought within the sphere of international regulation.
Assuming that decisions are made as to the legal status of the various
usable zones in space and as to the legal status of flight instrumentalities not now included in the international definition of "aircraft;" a
further problem must be solved: Some jurists appear to doubt if the
International Civil Aviation Organization, set up under the Chicago
Convention, should be designated as the international body to regulate
and control the use of all areas of space for non-military purposes, and
indicate that the problems of future rocket and satellite flight in upper
space are so interlinked with other international problems that some
new world organization must be created to deal with the new questions
involved. I am not yet convinced of the need for a new organization.
In summary, the purpose of this paper is to place before you certain basic problems. The solutions which I have tentatively suggested
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may not be accepted, but I do urge that as soon as the physical characteristics of the upper atmosphere and space beyond are sufficiently
known to warrant the adoption of acceptable rules, then an international conference be held to amend the Chicago Convention, or to
adopt a new convention, so that all areas of space now usable, or
which may become usable within a reasonable time, may be considered,
and agreement reached as to the status of each. Agreement must also
be reached as to how, and by whom, and under what circumstances,
new instrumentalities of flight, such as rockets and satellites, will be
regulated. It is certainly the duty of international lawyers to give these
matters their earnest attention so as to be in position, when the time
comes, to aid in reaching an international accord.

